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The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges political theorists to think about data 
ownership and policymakers to regulate the collection and use of public data. AI producers 
benefit from free public data for training their systems while retaining the profits. We argue 
against the view that the use of public data must be free. The proponents of unconstrained 
use point out that consuming data does not diminish its quality and that information is in am-
ple supply. Therefore, they suggest, publicly available data should be free. We present two 
objections. First, allowing free data use promotes unwanted inequality. Second, contributors 
of information did not and could not anticipate that their contribution would be used to train 
AI systems. 
charging for extensive data use is permissible and desirable. We discuss policy implications 
and propose a progressive data use tax to counter the inequality arising. 
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After decades of incremental growth, progress in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) is sud-
denly exploding. Better hardware and machine learning algorithms certainly play a role in this 
acceleration. But another crucial factor is  on a scale the world has 
not seen before (Polson and Scott 2018, 6). Remarkably, while the producers of AI draw on a 
public good  the reams of data provided by millions of contributors to the public parts of the 
World Wide Web  they typically create private goods: software or machines with proprietary 
code. For example, navigation apps collect huge datasets from public and non-public sources 
to improve their services2 and automated translation services can be trained using publicly 
available bilingual documents (e.g., Koehn 2010). This raises interesting normative questions. 
First, why should the profits reaped from these systems be privately retained, given that much 
of the data was provided by the public? And second, how should policymakers regulate the 
use of publicly available data? Some maintain that information and data should always be free 
to use. They justify this view by pointing out that information does not diminish in quality, 
regardless of how many people use it. They also observe that the information available on the 
World Wide Web is in rich abundance, so that a tax to overcome free-riding is unnecessary. 
unsound. This, in 
turn, suggests that societies are not obligated to allow unrestricted and unrecompensed use of 
publicly available information and that different ways to limit or charge for the use of public 
data are permissible; societies can choose how much free use they want to allow. 
While the regulation of data use, machine learning and AI has been identified as an important 
research field by legal and privacy scholars (e.g., Fairfield 2017; Lane et al. 2014), normative 
                                                 
2  https://support.google.com/mapcontentpartners/answer/9359673?hl=en&ref_topic=21600 
[accessed 30 July 2019]. 
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political theory is lagging behind. In particular, theorists should focus on the inequality created 
between those at the center and those at the periphery of technological development. Some 
firms producing AI systems have or are about to achieve enormous technological, economic, 
and social influence. At the same time, AI promises to be a disruptive technology that will 
displace, not only enhance many jobs (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2016).3 While the winners 
may get very wealthy, a greater number of people will likely be losers in this transition. And 
while there may be a prospect that new jobs are created and an overall gain in welfare is 
obtained lies in the short term (Frey 2019).  
Another sign of things to come is the inequality created between the employees of successful 
internet companies who have experienced fast-rising salaries and the employees in more 
-and- see their salaries stagnate 
(Bloom 2017).4  
In this paper, instead of , condemning 
the unequal distributive outcome of AI in isolation (e.g., Rawls 1999), we propose to train the 
focus on the production inputs and how their use causes inequality. More specifically, we ask 
whether the large-scale use of data for the creation of proprietary artificial intelligence systems 
provides grounds for requiring payment from the owners of artificial intelligence. This ap-
proach also helps to shed light on the nature of a special public good: public information. We 
                                                 
3  Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018 provide a formal model to explain how this can have a negative 
impact on demand for labor. 
4 The dawn of countless algorithms to classify, assess and sort clients, applicants, employees, 




will argue that limiting access to or charging for the use of that public good is, given certain 
conditions, permissible and often desirable. Developing rules for fair use of public data is most 
urgent now because data scraping and automated learning technologies, change 
the way data are created and used.  
The next section of the paper 
public good consisting of openly accessible information. We then explain how artificial intel-
ligence systems learn and why learning typically requires large amounts of information. The 
global information commons are a special public good because they are not undersupplied. 
We proceed to present the Free Use Argument for the global information commons. To show 
that it is unsound, we provide two different arguments against it. The Externality Argument 
points to the inequality that arises as a by-product of free information use. The Use Expecta-
tion Argument explores whether information providers have a right to control the use of in-
formation they add to the commons. The last two sections sketch some policy proposals and 
conclude. 
 
THE GLOBAL INFORMATION COMMONS 
The set of publicly available information on the internet, in libraries, and other open reposito-
ries is sometimes referred to as a global commons (Stiglitz 1999, 315; Hess and Ostrom 2003) 
or the creative commons (Creative Commons 2018; Boyle 2008, ch. 8). We will use the term 
global information commons to refer to all information that is available without access re-
striction. The internet is a major factor for the expansion of these commons; a largely decen-
tralized system of contributors has created a rich source of information. Much of this infor-
mation is provided by unpaid enthusiasts. The global information commons include blog posts, 
websites, shared videos, public social media posts, open access archives, and much more. 
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Not everything that is accessible to everyone may be used legally in every way possible.  For 
example, the licensing ]f 
you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under 
the same or a compatible license  (Wikipedia 2018). This is a non-trivial use restriction. By 
 legally be used in any way imaginable 
without any obligations to the creator (Boyle, 38-9). 
are now in the public domain because intellectual property rights have expired. And the CIA 
Factbook is in the public domain because the US federal government waived any rights to it 
(CIA 2018). The interesting question is: what kind of use restrictions ought to apply to the 
global information commons? An answer requires a better understanding of what the infor-
mation commons are. 
The information commons are characterized by four properties: 
(1) The information available is valuable to at least some users. 
(2) The information is non-rivalrous in consumption, so that, for the existing users, the mar-
ginal loss in this value from adding an additional user is zero. 
(3) Excluding users is difficult. 
(4) Most information is supplied on a voluntary basis. 
The first property tells us that the information commons are a good.5 Properties (2) and (3) are 
what most economists take as the two necessary features of public goods (Samuelson, 1954; 
                                                 
5 The global information commons are a good in many ways: as an educational resource, as a 
repository of human knowledge, a resource to spur technological innovation, etc. 
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for an application to data see Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2016, 62; Pollock 2009). First, infor-
mation is, by its very nature, non-rivalrous i
diminishes the good for others.  Information is non-rivalrous because an unlimited number of 
users does not diminish the good in any way.6 Second, once the information is available on 
the internet, it becomes hard to contain the circle of users.7 This suggests that the information 
commons are a public good in the traditional sense. (4) marks out a peculiar feature of the 
information commons: unlike many public goods that are only supplied with adequate incen-
tives, the information commons are to a large extent created without any need for incentives 
(Brynjolffson and McAfee 2016, 64).8 This fact will feature prominently in the Free Use Ar-
gument we criticize below. 
                                                 
6 It is often the case that the market value of information goes down the more people know 
about it. Therefore, even if the use of others does not diminish use value, it can diminish market 
value. That may constitute an argument to support intellectual property rights, as Cwik 2016 
points out. But this is not the issue at stake in the present argument. The problem is not that the 
subjects creating data want to keep exclusive commercial use rights. The problem is that others 
make use of data in a way that they object to, even if they consented to the data being part of 
the global information commons. 
7  Encryption techniques and digital rights management techniques offer effective use re-
strictions, but once the information is publicly available somewhere, exclusion becomes hard, 
if not impossible. 
8 Some other parts are a by-product of the desire to self-promote, seek attention, or to pursue 
business interests, but even in those cases the information is voluntarily provided. 
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Since we focus on the global information commo
beyond the scope of this paper, especially those big data sets that are not part of the global 
information commons. Since data9 is valuable, major tech companies also pursue business 
models that entice their clients to contribute ever more data over which they have exclusive 
control, outside of the global information commons. While this is an important topic in its 
own right (Lanier 2014; Mayer-Schoenberger and Ramge 2018, ch. 8; Sadowski 2019), this 
paper focuses on the global information commons. We do this because we think that there are 
already good normative reasons for limiting walled, non-public systems in their data harvest-
ing habits, for either principled (Kitchin 2017, ch. 3; Lessig 2004; Solove 2012) or pragmatic 
reasons (Mayer-Schoenberger and Ramge 2018, ch. 8). Our point in this paper is that, even if 
the walls are broken down and more data becomes public again, important normative issues 
about the use of the global information commons remain.  
MACHINE LEARNING: PRINCIPLES AND ECONOMICS 
There are three main kinds of artificial intelligence, one that exists now and two that are pre-
dicted to come into existence in the future. These can be distinguished as artificial narrow 
intelligence  (ANI), artificial general intelligence  (AGI), and artificial superintelligence  
                                                 
9 We use data  and information  interchangeably. Strictly speaking, information is data that 
has been processed, organized and analyzed. Information is therefore of greater value for the 
goal of acquiring knowledge. For this paper, the distinction between information and data is 




(ASI). ANI specializes in one task; AGI is generalized across a wide range of tasks and ap-
proximates human-level intelligence; and ASI outpaces human intelligence exponentially (Ur-
ban 2016). Each of these raise intriguing moral and political questions, but we re going to set 
ASI aside in this paper and focus on ANI and AGI. 
Examples of ANI include the chess-playing technology DeepBlue , various map and naviga-
tion apps, and the Go-playing technology AlphaGo,  which beat the human grandmaster Lee 
Sedol at Go in 2016 (Metz 2016). What many of these systems have in common is that they 
rely on publicly available information, which has been and continuously is created and made 
available by individual contributors across the world. Thus, for example, AlphaGo learned Go 
strategy through extensive training, based on records of both human and computer players. Its 
initial training was based on historical games, from a database containing some 30 million 
individual moves (Metz 2016). It then trained by playing against counterparts of itself (Silver 
& Hassabis 2016). Another example is automated language translation algorithms, learning 
from corpuses of translated texts, such as European Union documents (Koehn 2010). 
Not all ANIs depend on such data-led training. Strikingly
an algorithm that can learn how to play classic Atari computer games like Breakout . In this 
case, learning depends entirely on repeated attempts and not on data from human players 
(Mnih et al., 2015). More recently, the DeepMind team even presented a Go learning algo-
rithm that masters the game by just playing the game a great many times against itself (Silver 
et al., 2017), without any human moves as input. This shows that not all artificial intelligence 
depends on prior training data. Sometimes brute force  repeated attempts, combined with 
reinforcement learning, do the trick. However, Atari games and Go are particularly well-suited 
for this form of learning because the basic rules are very well-defined, the games are deter-
ministic, and the algorithm gets the chance to train by playing the game as often as necessary.  
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Most tasks for artificial intelligence will not be learnable in such a controlled environment. 
Steering a self-driving car, for example, requires navigating a complex and changing environ-
ment and dealing with random events. And, crucially, meaningful training depends on input 
from the real world, not only simulations. Therefore, learning from (many) mistakes is simply 
not an option for self-driving cars. Even seemingly more closely circumscribed tasks, such as 
translating from German to English, cannot be mastered by AI without drawing on extensive 
training data. Without data, the system simply would not get enough feedback to eliminate 
mistakes. 
The upshot is then, that in most cases, and certainly for more complex tasks, ANIs are parasitic 
on constantly expandi an even greater 
degree because they need to learn from a diverse set of situations to deal with complex envi-
ronments (Tegmark 2018, ch. 4). The functionality of most ANIs is made possible by the 
information people provide. The important point here is that the most interesting and promis-
ing ANIs are not only capable of learning, in many cases their functionality necessarily de-
pends on training data.  
The most important machine learning approach these days is the use of artificial neural net-
works, taking cues from biological brains. These networks have led to major learning break-
throughs. Image recognition, for example, is an area for which the combination of artificial 
neural networks and extensive training with real-world data is key to progress. For instance, 
trained artificial neural networks now match dermatologists in predicting the malignancy of 
skin lesions (Esteva et al., 2017). Interestingly, prior to be trained with skin lesion images, the 
AI learned how to recognize patterns by drawing on publicly available images.  Such unsu-
pervised learning  picks up on structures in the world without needing feedback from labelled 
data and opens new avenues for the training of AI (LeCun 2015).  
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It is not a coincidence that the major players in the field of AI are keen to collect as much data 
as they can. To some extent this data is useful to understand their own customers better, or to 
provide their users with the data they need. But another reason is that the development of AI 
cries out for additional data. For conventional information gathering purposes such as statistics, 
data quickly loses marginal value after a certain amount is accumulated (i.e. when there is 
enough data to make a statistically valid inference). But for machine learning purposes, more 
data does not lose marginal value as it allows AI systems to master more complex tasks (i.e. 
make compound inferences).10 When training machines to perform complex tasks, only a lot 
of data helps, and a lot of data helps a lot:  
urns to data may decline only gradually or there may even be increasing 
returns to data if more sophisticated tasks are disproportionately more valuable. This 
is consistent with the empirically-observed dominance of the data economy by a few 
(Arrieta-Ibarra et al. 2018, 40) 
There are at least three reasons why the commercial use of machine learning is likely to lead 
to a few very big and very important companies: 
1. Training AI systems able to interact with complex environments requires enormous 
data collection, storage and processing capacity, creating significant barriers to entry11; 
                                                 
10 See Posner & Weyl 2018, 224-230, for an excellent analysis of how data sometimes has 
increasing, rather than decreasing marginal returns for the purpose of machine learning. 
11 For a small but instructive example, consider the enormous amounts of 3D mapping data 
needed to navigate an autonomous car and other mobile robotic devices through a city like 
London. See Hook 2018. 
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2. The market for artificial intelligence systems tends to have a winner-takes-all structure. 
The best-performing systems are likely to become the preferred choice for all consum-
ers (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2016, ch. 10); 
3. Many tech companies have created services that ensure a constant stream of new data, 
which helps to improve their AI systems further, a positive enforcement loop.12 
Each effect on its own is sufficient for undermining market competition. But taken together, 
the effects are likely mutually reinforcing and lead to the emergence of a small number of 
major players, unrivalled in economic power and influence, not unlike the current market for 
major internet and tech companies, though possibly more extreme. One can already observe 
that the market-leading firms in digitalization experience fast growth, while others lag behind. 
On the level of employees, a hollowing out the middle-skill portion  of the job market is 
predicted, leading to a widening income gap (McKinsey 2015, 12). While one cannot know 
for certain, we will work with this empirical assumption: without regulatory intervention, and 
provided that free training data continues to be in plentiful supply, the market for AI systems 
will likely contribute to substantially increased economic inequality. Furthermore, the greater 
dominance of a few major corporations will make it increasingly difficult for others to chal-
lenge their market position, entrenching the rising economic inequality. It will also add to 
inequalities in technological dominance of private actors and likely an increased social and 
political influence of the future owners of the most advanced AI systems. 
 
                                                 
12 See Weber 2017, for examples of this positive feedback loop on an international level. 
13 
 
USE, NOT PROVISION, IS THE PROBLEM
Since the information commons is a public good, one might think that it faces the same prob-
lem as most public goods: free-riding on the freely provided public good. Upon closer inspec-
tion, however, free-riding in provision is not a concern that pertains to the information com-
mons. The real problem, we will argue, is unrestricted use.  
Consider, for contrast, a classic example of a public good: a light house signal. Using the 
signals to navigate is non-rivalrous because use by additional ships does not diminish the use 
value for others. Exclusion of users is difficult because ships operating in open waters are hard 
to monitor and charges consequently difficult to enforce. Such a public good is costly in pro-
duction. In a free market it will be under-supplied (or not supplied at all) because users have 
an incentive to free-ride on  provision and suppliers will not be paid for the socially 
optimal level of service.  
This example helps us to see how different the information commons are in that regard. For a 
start, accessing the good without contributing to its provision (which would otherwise be free-
riding) is not a problem; in fact, it is invited. Providers of information want other users to 
access the information  that is the very point of posting information publicly. And notably, 
the information commons do not suffer from information under-supply. Instead, what we see 
is a remarkable level of voluntary information provision by a great many members of the 
public. Some of this apparent voluntariness may be driven by hidden non-altruistic motives. 
Still, the fact remains that the global information commons have been filled with content in a 
largely non-enforced, non-regulated fashion and with only limited monetary incentives. This 
shows that the information commons are very much unlike lighthouses: they get provided in 
good measure without enforcement. 
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The relevant question is therefore not how we can ensure that everybody contributes. Free-
riding in provision, the standard problem for most public goods, is not the concern. The real 
issue is about the permissibility of using the information commons in excessive, unanticipated 
ways. 
 
THE FREE USE ARGUMENT  
One may think that charging for public information is always impermissible because infor-
mation is the perfect public good. This argument is often appealed to, but rarely stated pre-
cisely.13 Justice Brandeis alludes to it here: 
The general rule of law is that the noblest of human productions    knowledge, truths 
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas  became, after voluntary communication to others, 
free as the air to common use.   
(International News Serv. vs. Associated Press, 250, Brandeis dissenting; see also 
Benkler 1999) 
Brandeis appeals to the idea that information, once it has been passed on to others, becomes 
part of a commons that is free to use for everyone.  
Not all uses are allowed, of course: works that are protected by copyright may not (legally) be 
reproduced or re-used in specific ways without permission, but if they are offered to the public 
they may still be read, digested, and processed. Similarly, information protected by patents is 
                                                 
13 A notable exception is Benkler 2006, chapter 2. The argument has also been suggested to us 
by colleagues in discussion. 
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legally restricted in specific uses, though may still be freely consumed in other ways. Copy-
right and patent restrictions are in place to prevent under-supply of such content. However, 
for the sake of this argument we can put prohibited uses of copyrighted or patented material 
to one side; of interest to us are non-appropriating uses such as reading, digesting, and pro-
follow. 
In our reconstruction14, the argument from free use runs as follows: 
The Free Use Argument 
(1) The information commons are a perfect public good and thus non-rivalrous in use. 
(2) The information needed for the information commons is not under-supplied. 
(3) If a good is non-rivalrous in use and not under-supplied, no one is adversely affected by 
the use of the good. 
(4) Because the information commons are non-rivalrous in use and not under-supplied, no 
one is adversely affected by their use.  
(5) Using a public good free of charge without adversely affecting anyone is always per-
missible. 
(6) Therefore, using the global information commons free of charge (even extensively and 
for private gain) is always permissible.  
                                                 
14 A related argument against intellectual property protection is analysed and dismissed by 
Himma 2005 and Moore 2012. Cwik 2016 provides a very helpful critical review of that debate. 
Our focus, however, is on data, not intellectual property, and our goal is different: to show that 
some uses of the information commons may be restricted. 
16 
 
An important upshot of the Free Use Argument is that, if sound, it rules out any restrictions 
on or charges for the use of the global information commons, rendering such restrictions im-
permissible. We aim to show that the Free Use Argument is unsound by demonstrating that 
premises (3) and (5) are false. If the free use argument is not sound, we have removed an 
important argument against regulating the use of the information commons, weakening the 
case against regulation. If and how a society should attempt such a regulation, of course, de-
pends on a number of normative and practical factors that need to be balanced. We will make 
some proposals in that regard at the end of this article. 
The proponents of the Free Use Argument might insist that information is a special public 
good. While tangible goods can be owned, information cannot be owned in the same way, the 
argument goes. Sure enough, there are intellectual property rights, but even the most stringent 
such rights do not prevent users from consuming and digesting information. This would lead 
to the more restricted:  
 (5*)  Using public information free of charge without adversely affecting anyone is always 
permissible. 
We take (5*) to be the most promising rendering of the premise. It usefully restricts the Free 
Use Argument to public information. And, in combination with (4), it rules out problems aris-
ing from under-provision, which would have made usage fees permissible. In case of the 
global information commons, however, under-provision is simply not an issue. Therefore, the 
argument goes, the only reason for use charges is eliminated and freedom of use is the logical 
outcome. 
However, this turns out to be too hasty. Our strategy against the Free Use Argument is based 
on the idea that people creating public goods like the global information commons may be 
permitted to regulate the use of the public good if this is in the public interest. To determine 
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whether use ought to be regulated, two questions should be considered. First, is the free use 
of the public good serving publicly endorsed goals, or does it create unwanted negative exter-
nalities that regulation could mitigate? Second, is the way the public good is used in line with 
the intentions that its creators had in mind (or reasonably should have had in mind) when 
creating the public good?  
To pursue these two questions and defeat the Free Use Argument, we first train our attention 
on premise (3), which we aim to reject in the next section. We revisit Premise (5*) in the 
section thereafter. However, it is worth pointing out that positive answers to our two questions 
only provide pro tanto reasons in favor of regulating the global information commons. 
Whether we ought to regulate also depends on whether regulation would be overall beneficial, 
addresses the concerns raised by our questions, and does so in an effective way. 
 
THE EXTERNALITY ARGUMENT 
The Externality Argument shows that the empirical claim of premise (3) is often false, and 
indeed false in the case of how major AI companies use the global information commons. 
Demonstrating this is theoretically quite straightforward: we need to show that, even though 
the information commons are non-rivalrous in use and not under-supplied, there are adverse 
effects on others caused by some forms of use. If we succeed in doing so, then (4) is false, 
providing a counter-example to (3).  
The information commons are supplied on a sufficient level by volunteers. What could be 
wrong with using this pool of information for free? Proponents of the free use argument sug-
gest that no one is adversely affected by the intensive use of a good, as long as the good is 
non-rivalrous in use and the provision problem has been taken care of. Admittedly, in a spe-
18 
 
cific narrow sense that is true: using more of the information commons does not take the in-
formation commons away from anyone. The resource does not diminish, and the other users 
are not affected in their use of the information commons.  
But why consider only direct effects? If you are concerned about the distributive impact of 
providing free use, then you will worry that other users are affected in an indirect way: by 
increasing inequality if the producers of highly capable AI will become very rich and influen-
tial. Economic inequality is the most immediate effect, but this is likely to be followed by 
inequality in social influence, unequal access to information, and political inequality.15 Con-
sequently, allowing such very intense use is far from harmless: while it does not diminish the 
resource, it has side effects that are better avoided: the inequality created as a negative exter-
nality of extensive use.  
The structure of this argument is familiar to political theorists. There are economic transac-
tions that look unobjectionable if one only considers the transactions on their own terms, but 
objectionable when taking into account the distributive effect. For a famous example, take 
Robert itlement theory, made vivid by the Wilt Chamberlain  example (Nozick 
1974, 160-4). Nozick envisages a set of voluntary transactions among property owners or in-
dividuals exercising their self-ownership. Specifically, many basketball fans are prepared to 
pay extra for seeing basketball star Wilt Chamberlain play, making each fan only a little poorer 
but Chamberlain a lot richer, leading to economic inequality. Nozick, famously, sees nothing 
                                                 
15 Sadowski 2019 argues that data can be understood as a form of capital; not only valuable in 
itself, but also a means to generate value, monetary and otherwise.  
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in the transactions that can be objected to and consequently denies that any measures to inter-
fere with these voluntary transactions could be just. Because the transactions are voluntary, 
no one involved can object, Nozick maintains. 
Many critics were quick to point out that, even if all transactions are unobjectionable accord-
ing to the criteria we use to assess such transactions by themselves, the aggregate result may 
still be objectionable (Cohen 1995, chapter 1; Dworkin 2000, 110-12). One can criticize the 
outcome along two different lines. First, the distribution arising from many individual trans-
actions may be objectionable even if each particular transaction is not  and, indeed, the indi-
viduals involved in the Chamberlain example might not have agreed to pay if they had known 
of this distributive outcome (Cohen 1995, 23). It does not follow, as Cohen points out, from 
people being willing to pay to watch Wilt play that they are willing to pay Wilt to play (Cohen 
1995, 26). Second, the Chamberlain fans are faced with the choice of either watching Cham-
berlain and contributing to his riches, or not watching Chamberlain to avoid contributing to 
his riches. What they are missing is a third option: watching Chamberlain play without making 
him rich. It is this third option that they arguably should be provided with  and the one egal-
itarian, basketball-loving citizens would prefer. These two considerations support redistribu-
tion or taxing the transactions. For example, there might be a case for putting a sales tax on 
ing the income. 
The structural similarity to the use of the information commons should be apparent. Replace 
the transactions in the market with the contribution to and use of the free information com-
mons. In both cases, the actions considered on their own merit are not the problem. The con-
tributions to the commons are voluntary, and the use of the commons is prima facie permitted 
because the commons offer a non-rivalrous public good in sufficient supply. The problem with 
the free use of the commons is the distributive effect: The availability of so much free infor-
mation creates a social possibility that some companies may exploit; and if they do, this creates 
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more inequality than many societies are (and ought to be) prepared to accept. And these effects 
are further exacerbated by the monopoly-like status that several such companies enjoy, which 
undermines competition and the viability of customers opting out from their data-collecting 
services (Posner & Weyl 2018, 230-239). 
The contributors to the global information commons are effectively forced into a choice be-
tween two options: they can either continue to supply information in the usual way, thereby 
accepting that producers of AI systems will use the information for free to become rich and 
powerful. Or they can withdraw from the internet, stop contributing to the global information 
commons, to subsidizing
free information. This is an unenviable choice, as the opportunity costs for withdrawing from 
the internet are substantial and increasing.  
A third option ought to be on the choice menu: contributing to the global information com-
mons without turning AI producers into new super-charged Wilt Chamberlains. Since this 
option is currently unavailable, it is not true that the free use of the global information com-
mons by AI producers is without adverse effects. The adverse effect is the inequality it pro-
duces. And just like basketball fans do not make a fully voluntary choice when selecting be-
tween making Chamberlain rich or stopping attending games, contributors to the information 
commons do not make a fully voluntary choice when selecting between making AI producers 
rich or stopping contributing to the global information commons.  
There is, however, a relevant di
contributions to the global information commons: the individuals deciding to pay to see Cham-
berlain play decide to part with their money in exchange for the performance and they know 
that that money w  And even if 
they have not consented to the pernicious effects of the resulting inequality, they have  in 
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some minimal sense  consented to these transactions and their predicable aggregate effect. 
By contrast, the voluntary contributors to the global information commons do not engage in a 
market exchange. Their mode of interaction is not intended as payment for a service provided.  
Moreover, when they are offering one small 
contribution to a much larger effect of the same type. When people contribute content to the 
information commons, however, they produce an entirely unrelated aggregate effect. There-
fore, since the inequality that arises from the training of artificial intelligence systems is a 
byproduct, an unintended external consequence, to an even greater extent, our externality ar-
gument is even The unexpected nature of use 
and effects also links the Externality Argument with the Use Expectation Argument, to which 
we will turn in the next section. 
The upshot of this discussion is that premise (4) is typically false. The unlimited use of the 
information commons causes negative externalities in the form of inequality. Since this is an 
adverse effect, a counter-example to premise (3) has been provided, and therefore that premise 
must be rejected. It remains an empirical matter, of course, how much inequality is caused by 
letting AI builders use the whole information commons for free, but the effect is likely large. 
It is possible to resist the externality argument by denying the egalitarian starting point. Nozick, 
famously, took such a libertarian view, rejecting the idea that equality is important enough to 
justify interfering with self-ownership (Nozick 1974, 160-74). In a similar vein, one might 
suggest the inequality externality does not matter enough to undermine the conclusion of the 
Free Use Argument. This position, however, flies in the face of even minimally egalitarian 
theories. And while Nozick could argue that taxing individuals is a significant interference 
with self-ownership (he famously compares taxes with slavery), taxing data only affects self-
ownership in the most minimal way: it prevents the producers of data from giving away their 
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data to tech companies for free. But most contributors never intended to do that anyhow, as 
we explain in the next section. 
 
THE USE EXPECTATION ARGUMENT 
While we have just seen that the empirical part of premise (3) is often false, there are also 
reasons to reject premise (5*). Recall, the premise at stake is: 
(5*)  Using public information free of charge without adversely affecting anyone is always 
permissible. 
On the face of it, there is a strong case in favor of completely free information, without any 
use restrictions. Many internet activists embrace a culture of free and open sharing, with con-
tent that is free for everyone to use, distribute, and remix. If intellectual property legislation 
and copyright laws become too tilted in favor of protecting vested commercial interests, so 
the argument goes, the initiative of creators is constrained (Lessig 2004, 29).16 The fight 
against excessive copyright restrictions appears to have blindsided internet activists in one 
respect, however: the danger of unwittingly supporting the commercial interests of enterprises 
that consume large amounts of data.17  
                                                 
16 It is worth noting that the popularity of this view might also be due to path dependency and 
how the internet has historically developed, rather than independently formed user intentions 
(see e.g. Posner & Weyl, 209-213). This, of course, further strengthens our argument. 
17 Some, however, have picked up on this danger, most notably Jaron Lanier (2014). 
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In brief, our argument against (5*) is this: First, taking information from others is normally 
impermissible. Second, it is permissible with consent, but in the context of the global infor-
mation commons the consent is implicit. Third, whether one may assume implicit consent 
depends on what is at stake and how far the actions depart from normal expectations. Fourth, 
using data to train AI involves high stakes and is a significant departure from expectations. 
Therefore, fifth, only a strong form of consent suffices. Finally, since such a form of consent 
has not been given, using the global commons on a large scale to train AI is presumed to be 
impermissible, unless there are other overriding reasons. We will now state this argument in 
detail. 
Let us begin with the observation that the taking of information is normally only permissible 
with consent. For example, it is impermissible for someone to secretly copy your research 
notes, regardless of whether they use them to benefit society, and regardless of the fact that 
you do not lose your notes if they are copied. By contrast copying them with your consent is 
permissible. Therefore, the real question is what the contributors to the global information 
commons have consented to.  
In the case of the global information commons, most consent is implicit  it lies in the act of 
contribution and publication. Internet users post information for different reasons. They may 
want to help others to find information. They may want to speak to an audience or advertise 
their work or their thoughts. But very few users expected that they will help train AI systems 
that will make their owners become very powerful und rich.  Have they consented in implicit 
fashion nevertheless?  
On a first pass, . For example, a DIY expert may create a website 
explaining how to fix plumbing issues with the expectation of helping users save on repairs. 
If a user learns the necessary skills from that website and sets up a lucrative plumbing business, 
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then it is implausible for the website creator to not have expected this and deem it impermis-
sible. By making content available on the internet one implicitly consents to such use scenarios. 
The contributors to the information commons know this (or ought to have known, anyway).  
What kind of uses can contributors reasonably expect? The internet changes quickly, so it is 
not easy to give a general answer. However, one structural factor about use remained stable 
until recently: the use of content was constrained by the capacity of an agent being able to 
understand and interpret content. Understanding and interpretation are capacities unique to 
humans. For this reason, a contributor to the global information commons was  until very 
recently  assured of one fact: a human would be needed to interpret and understand their 
contribution. And since human capacities for processing content are limited, no single indi-
vidual would be able to process excessively large parts of the information commons on their 
own. The natural limitation of the human ability to take up content created an individual use 
expectation for the global information commons. 
The individual use expectation has been shattered with the advent of automated learning and 
AI. A new class of users is arriving on the scene: learning AI system with their insatiable 
hunger for new data and the ability to process information very quickly. This, then, is the use 
that the contributors to the information commons have (typically) not expected and (almost 
never) intended. 
What kind of consent is required under such conditions? Tom Dougherty  (2015) work helps 
clarify this. Following Dougherty, the higher the stakes involved in a consensual transaction, 
and the more the relevant act runs counter to normal expectations, the more important it is to 
obtain consent grounded in common belief among the affected parties. This ensures that eve-
ryone has the same beliefs, and everybody knows about these beliefs. Common belief guaran-
tees that all parties are on the same page , ruling out misunderstandings about what was 
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agreed. Clearly, most tech companies harvesting the global information commons have not 
obtained consent in the form of common beliefs. They have, at most, obtained an implicit 
consent for some uses, stemming from the decisions to post publicly.18 But this 
does not suffice as consent for AI training use because the stakes are especially weighty and 
the new use unexpected: the amount of data used as well as the effects of that use are as 
important as they are surprising, as we have seen. Under such circumstances, only consent 
with common belief will do. 
If use goes beyond normal expectations or norms, the onus lies on the data collector to show 
that the subject would have good reasons to consent, or that the societal benefits are so over-
whelming that one may proceed without consent (Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014; Nissenbaum 
2009, ch. 7). The first condition is unlikely to be met, the second would require a careful 
assessment and societal debate that is yet to take place. In addition, there is a systematic mis-
match between the intentions with which users provide data (such as knowledge gathering and 
social networking) and the purpose for which corporations need the data (i.e. to target adver-
tising and train their AI systems).19 There is also a related mismatch between the often ideal-
istic motives of the contributors and the purely commercial interests of corporations using the 
data.  
                                                 
18 Indeed, Sadowski 2019 notes that end-user license agreements (EULAs), commonly used to 
obtain consent from contributors are long, dense legal documents [ designed to prevent 
even the most enterprising person from being informed of the binding terms and conditions  
(7). Because of this, he argues, the type of consent acquired by data corporations through EU-
LAs bears little resemblance to common meanings of consent  (8). 
19 See Posner & Weyl 2018, 220-224. 
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Without consent, premise (5*) is not plausible, despite oric. Even if 
no one is adversely affected by the use of public information, the authors or contributors of 
that information have a case against such use because the right type of consent is missing. 
Proponents of free use would owe us an overriding reason important enough to waive the 
consent requirement, a reason difficult to provide. 
One might object that contributors to joint voluntary projects often have all kinds of expecta-
tions, but these expectations do not necessarily give them the right to control the use of their 
product. For instance, if Ann helps to plant a local community garden on public land, Ann 
cannot expect to have control over who uses the garden and how. If, for example, Ann has the 
intention to create this garden as a resting place for the elderly, her expectation does not give 
Ann the right to chase away the young office worker. However, o
use expectation was unreasonable from the start. By contrast, the contributors to the global 
information commons had a reasonable expectation, one that is undermined if the information 
is automatically read, collated and processed by machines to train AI systems.  
A second line of objection points to the fact that nearly all intellectual activities are built on 
those of others. Indeed, one powerful argument in favor of free use is the innovative potential 
of the internet, where information is often given new and unexpected form, improving and 
enriching the commons. Some might argue this function is the very reason why the infor-
mation commons are a good . Does the use expectation argument lead to the absurd conclu-
sion that all such use is impermissible unless consent can be shown? For example, if a novelist 
writes a bestseller, she benefits from the input of many others who have shaped the language 
she is using. And these contributors have not consented to the specific use. Nevertheless, it is 
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implausible that the nov 20 For a response we need to 
explain the difference between the language and the information commons case. First, we 
maintain that language contributors are implicitly consenting. Language is a social product, 
and it has always been used for diverse purposes. Writing a commercially successful novel is 
well within the range of expected use, so implicit consent can be assumed. By contrast, the 
use of data to train AI is a novel, unexpected kind of use. We also observe, second, that intu-
itions about the language argument flip when pushed to extremes. Imagine a clever business-
man who unexpectedly comes into contact with extra-terrestrial aliens and sells them a com-
plete inventory of the English language, making a fortune. In that case, the people contributing 
to English as a public good can complain that they did not consent, neither explicitly nor 
implicitly, to the sale and its distributive effects. This fictive example shows that the difference 
lies in the novelty and scale of the new use, in line with our argument against public data use 
to train AI. The more novel or unexpected the use, and the larger the stakes, the more important 
it is to obtain consent as common belief.  
A final objection denies that consent is needed for using data once it has been added to the 
global information commons, as contributors relinquish any moral rights to that data with the 
act of publication. However, this misconceives the complexity of rights given up, retained and 
created when contributing to a public good.21 For a simple example, if you contribute to a 
community potluck, you are happy for your cake to be eaten by neighbors (to which you have 
                                                 
20 We thank Jacob T. Levy, the editor, for raising this objection. 
21  7) 
contextual analysis of informational norms, especially her discussion of transmission princi-
ples  on p. 145ff. 
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consented by contributing) but you can rightfully object to it being 
profit (to which you have not consented). The example shows that contributors to public goods 
normally retain the right that their contribution is used in line with consent (often implicit) 
about the purpose of the public good. Contribution might also create a new right to jointly 
regulate the public good created. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS 
Contributions to the global information commons tend to have the unwanted side-effect of 
promoting inequality. This is for two reasons. First, we provide the developers of AI with a 
crucial resource for free, as explained above.  Second, and in addition to the reasons discussed 
above, there are structural reasons why big-data-driven economies tend to benefit large com-
panies: increasing returns when scaling up (Arthur 1989), network effects (Zhang et al. 2015), 
and feedback effects due to improved predictive power of larger datasets (Mayer-Schoen-
berger and Ramge 2018, ch. 8). These mechanisms give advantages to those who gather most 
data and those who enter the market first, reinforcing the inegalitarian trend.  
We now want to sketch two proposals to tackle this problem: creating a new market for data 
labor, and asking heavy users to pay for the services of the global information commons by 
introducing a progressive tax for data use.  
Lanier (2014, 16), Arrieta-Ibarra et al. (2018), and Posner & Weyl (2018, chap. 5) propose a 
erty of its creator, enabling the creator to charge for data use. In terms of the Free Use Argu-
ment, the proposal works against premise (1) by changing the property regime from commons 
to private property. Contributors to the global information commons are turned into owners 
of data, and this data can only be used if the owners agree.  
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Privatizing the global information commons in that way will come with some problems, how-
ever. For a start, the system can only be implemented if it is possible to process very small 
payments efficiently. If the transaction costs dwarf the economic value of the separate pieces 
of data, the market will dry up. In addition, the buyers of data also need to check whether the 
data they buy is new and useful, not recycled old data or meaningless noise. Checking this 
will surely be automated, but the computational power needed to do so might well be so ex-
pensive that each small, single transaction becomes pointless. A data as labor payment system 
also requires a method for assessing the value of each item of data and information. This is a 
 
Perhaps these implementation problems can be overcome. But there are other practical and 
normative shortcomings. First, privatizing the commons might lead to an under-supply or de-
terioration of the global information commons. If contributors can charge for their information 
while access to the global commons stays free, then an additional incentive is created for gath-
ering data in closed networks rather than in an open access network. This is because the data 
is relatively more valuable if one has exclusive access to it. The market price for exclusive 
data will be higher, so that contribution to the Global Information Commons are financially 
less attractive and the commons are likely to deteriorate. 
The second, normative problem with the Data as Labor  proposal concerns distributive effects. 
With payments flowing from data users to data owners, the resulting distribution might be 
more equal. But it might also reward the wrong people. Content producers are often highly 
educated and economically advantaged (Hargittai and Walejko 2008; Schradie 2012). Addi-
tional payment for their services might lead to additional benefits for the already better-off. 
Then again, class of self-employed data laborers with 
precarious incomes . Whatever the outcome might 
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directly tackle the externality problem because it leaves the dis-
tribution to a new market for data labor, with difficult to predict distributive implications. 
 would go some length to address concerns arising from use expec-
tation, as the data producers literally take ownership of their data and can ensure that their use 
expectations are respected. 
A second policy option is to think about the global information commons not as a set of many 
small pieces of individual property, but as a commons that can be governed as a whole (Mo-
rozov 2018). One way to govern these commons is to charge for extensive use. In practice, 
this will amount to a tax on data used.22 The actual tax base could be the amount of data 
accessed. Alternatively, one could use imperfect proxies, such as computing power or data 
storage capacity, which might be easier to determine by measuring physical infrastructure. A 
well-designed ax the most intense, industrial uses of the global information 
commons, without creating disincentives for smaller users of the global information commons. 
It should be a progressive data tax. It would allow free or almost free access for human users 
to promote unhindered exchange of ideas on the internet. Ideally, it would target those corpo-
rations that profit most from data use.23 To reduce the negative externality of inequality, the 
                                                 
22 See Chris Hughes (2018) for a proposal and some design challenges. For a related debate on 
a tax on robots, see, e.g., Englisch (2018) with further references. 
23 We thank Laura Valentini for suggesting this to us. One theoretically attractive option would 
be to make the corporate tax rate dependent on data use. In practice, however, this will be 
difficult to implement, as it creates incentive to choose a corporate structure that separates data 
use from profit.  
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tax revenue could be used to widen access to and participation in the global information com-
mons. 
A progressive data tax will not give the individual providers of information the right to charge 
for their individual contributions. However, the tax targets, more directly than the other policy 
proposals, the central problem we identified: that free access for all produces unacceptable 
levels of inequality. The externality argument can be used to justify such a tax. If implemented 
well, it could reduce the inegalitarian effect of free data use, and the tax revenues can be 
employed to tackle inequality directly. For these reasons, we think that a progressive data tax 




The internet, once imagined as a sphere of free information exchange among equals, has 
turned into a resource. Intended as a commons to be useful for all, it is now the well of data 
for private enterprises, used by AI companies to train their self-learning systems. These com-
panies are currently allowed to use the resource without charges and without restrictions. One 
may think that this is only right: since using information does not diminish the use value for 
others, no one is negatively affected. But this is an erroneous thought: the free big data supply 
increases economic and other inequality, and it disrespects the use expectations of many con-
tent providers. Free use does have adverse effects, and this is why the use of the information 
commons may and ought to be regulated.  
The global information commons are not owned by anyone. But that does not mean that their 
use should be a free-for-all to the benefit of the biggest and most powerful players. A progres-
sive data tax could be an effective policy instrument to prevent the inegalitarian trend. Other 
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policy options might be available. How and to what extent we regulate the global information 
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